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My initial recommendation in this cases was to 
postpone and to call for the record in each case. Upon 
reflection, I have become convinced that the disposition of 
United States v. Lee, No .~·767 (to be argued 11/2/81) could 
affect the Court's treatment of these cases. Although Lee 
primarily concerns a ~ee Exercise challenge to the FUTA, that 
case also implicates a potential Establishment issue. These 
appeals present t e opposite situation: a primary concern with 
an alleged FUTA Establishment violation with a lurking Free 
Exercise problem. I now think the potential overlap is 
sufficiently significant to warrant a hold in all three cases 
for Lee. 
RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a hold for Lee. 
There is a response. 
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GRACE BRETHERN CHURCH, et al. 
v. 
UNITED STATES, et al. Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Church groups challenged the 
constitutionality of the V''Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 
and its California state counterpart. The DC found the laws 
violate the Establishment Clause but are in accord with the 
./.:' 
Free Exercise Clause. In No. 81-31, the State of California 
appeals the DC's finding of an Establishment violation. The SG -
argues a similar appeal in No : 81-228, but he also asserts the 
./ 
DC lacked jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act (TIA). In 
No. 81-455, the churches contend the FUTA contravenes the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The FUT A , 2 6 U . S . C . 
§§3301-11, is a tax levied on employers and calculated as a 
percentage of wages paid. Employers are given a credit against 
this federal liability for up to 90% of contributions to 
federally approved ~tate unemployment compensation funds. All 
states have enacted such parallel coverage laws. 
The FUTA excludes from coverage services performed "in 
the employ of (A) a church or convention or association of 
churches, or (B) an organization which is operated primarily 
for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, 
controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention 
3. 
or association of churches " 26 u.s.c. 3309 (b) (1). 
Cal.'s law contains a similar exclusion. 
The Lutheran and the Grace Brethern Churches operate 
private elementary and secondary schools. They sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief against collection of the 
lt '" 
federal and state taxes levied on waged paid in these schools. 
The suits were consolidated and the DC determined the TIA, 28 --
u.s.c. §1341, (DC shall not enjoin state tax if plain, speedy, 
and efficient remedy available in state court) did not remove 
its jurisdiction. Under Cal. law, said the DC,the availability 
of tax injunctive relief was, "at best, uncertain" in Cal. 
courts. In a footnote, the DC conceded there was "some" Cal. 
authority making iniunctions available when constitutional 
challenges were mounted to state tax laws. The DC said, 
however, this authority was "neither compelling nor recent." 
S.G.'s Jur. Stmt. at 18a n.l2. Alternative state remedies--
which might require that the churches pay the tax and later sue 
for refund--were inadequate, decided the D.C., because the 
churches claimed the very process of determining whether the 
tax was due violated the First Amendment. 
On the merits, the court held private schools that 
were either of the 
1b~orate structure of a church 
(Category I schools) or 
1
{Hrectly affiliated with a church 
(Category II schools) were excluded from the FUTA under 
§3309(b) (1) 's language. This decided the Lutheran suit in the 
church's favor. The Grace Brethren suit, however, required the 
4. 
DC to consider religiously oriented schools not controlled by a -
church (Category III schools) , which the DC decided were 
included within the FUTA. The court ruled this inclusion 
caused excessive church/state entanglement. It consequently 
held 26 u.s.c. §3309(b) (1) and its Cal. state counterpart to be 
unconstitutional as appJ.ied under the Establishment Clause. 
~fter the DC had rendered its opinions, this Court 
decided St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 
101 s.ct. 2142 (1981). This case held schools do not have a 
legal identity separate from a FUTA-exempt church--a holding 
that is similar to the DC's conclusion regarding Category I 
schools. St. Martin did not decide the issue of coverage for 
Catogory II and III schools. See id. at 2148 n.l2. Neither 
did it reach First Amendment issues. Id. at 2151. 
No. 81-31. 
CALIFORNIA'S CONTENTIONS: The unemployment 
compensation process occurs in two steps: determination 
whether an employer must pay the tax and determination whether 
a discharged employee is eligible for benefits. We appeal only 
from the portion of the judgment finding entanglement in the 
benefit eligibility process regarding employees of religious 
schools. Any entanglement that might occur in this process 
would be de minimis, as the issue would be whether an employee 
knowingly violated an established work rule. Although 
employers can establish work rules incorporating religious 
belief, the question to be answered in the state's benefit 
5. 
eligibility inquiry would not be whether the work rule 
conformed to church doctrine. The state could be interested 
only in the existence of an individual's religious belief or 
doctrinal understanding, not in the truth of that belief or 
understanding. Consequently the state's inquiry would be 
purely secular and inoffensive to the Establishment Clause. 
CHURCHES' CONTENTIONS: California underestimates the 
complexity of religious faith. For instance, religious ideals 
1 ike "fervor" cannot be defined precisely. Benefit inquiries 
would also embroil hearing examiners in credibility issues 
resolvable only by religious examination. The DC's sound 
decision requires no further review. 
No. 81-228 
(1) The DC lacked jurisdiction 
because no federal tax on non-profit 
institutions but requires that participating states levy a 
state tax. The TIA bars the OC's declaration and injunction 
against such a state tax so long as the churches have an 
adequate remedy ;n state courts--as they do here. Nonetheless,~~ 
the Secretary of the Treasury needs a definitive interpretation ~ 
of §3309(b) and urges this Court to reach the merits. Cf~? 
. '• 
McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 u.s. 21, 31-32 (1975). (2) The DC 
erred in fearing that unconstitutionalentanglement would result ~ 
from worker benefits determinations. Federal and s~~ 
unemployment compensation laws in no way limit an employer's 
ability to establish whatever work rules it wishes and to 
-
6. 
require adherence to them as a condition of employment. 
Religious colleges have been covered by similar laws since 
1970, and the churches here have not found a single actual 
claim for unemployment benefits that required inquiry into 
religious doctrines. 
CHURCHES' CONTENTIONS: (1) The DC had jurisdiction 
under the TIA because the state remedy is inadequate. Cal. 
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, but its 
administrative agencies cannot, under the Cal. constitution, 
declare statutes unconstitutional. The administrative review 
itself would have been religiously entangling and unduly 
expensive. The churches here protest an unconstitutional 
taxing procedure, and denial of federal relief will result in 
denial of their federal rights. ( 2) The churches reiterate 
their arguments on the merits made in No. 81-31. 
No. 81-455 
CHURCHES' CONTENTIONS: The DC incorrectly said the 
tax on the ministry was indirect and insufficiently burdensome 
to violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
SG'S CONTENTIONS: Because the churches do not seek to 
expand upon the relief awarded in the judgment below, it is 
unnecessary for them to file a cross-appeal to preserve their 
argument that FUTA violates the Free Exercise Clause. See Rule 
10.5. In any event, the Free Exercise claims are without 
merit. 
7. 
DISCUSSION: The question of FUTA's constitutionality 
under the Religion Clauses is 
unresolved in St. Martin. If the 
an important issue left 
LA-" 
route Aclear to the merits, 
notes of probable jurisdiction would be in order in Nos. 31 and 
228. I agree with the SG that the churches' appeal in No. 455 
is unnecessary as it seeks no relief beyond that granted below. ) .., 
See United States v. Raines, 362 u.s. 17, 27 n.7 (1960). 
The DC's treatment of the TIA seems erroneous. 1 
Although this probably removes the DC's power to adjudicate the 
propriety of the state tax, it does not necessarily impair its 
ability to invalidate §3309 (b) (1) of the federal tax statute~ 
1The DC reasoned state court relief was not adequate to 
protect federal constitutional rights because state law barred 
all injunctive relief in tax suits. Even making the 
implausible assumption that . this is an ?Ccurate reading of 
state law, but se·e DC opn at n.l2 (cited at page 3 of this 
memo), state courts must enforce federal rights. A state law 
limitation on a proper remedy for a federal constitutional 
injury would be void under the Supremacy Clause because state 
court must be capable of granting adequate constitutional 
relief. State courts conse uentl do indeed afford the taxpayer 5~ 
a "fu~h~ng an JU 1c1a determ1na 10n, osewell v. -- ~ /.~Jj 
LaSarlelNat'lJBank, 101 S.Ct. 1221, 1230 (1981), demonstrating ~~ 
that the TIA bars federal injunctive intervention in this suit.~4~~ - --~ 
As the SG points out, S.G. Jur. Stmt. at 7 n.7, the ----y~ 
fact the DC also was asked to provide declaratory relief adds 
little to its power. Although this Court apparently has not 
held the TIA proscribes federal tax declaratory judgments, 
comments in this area reveal the TIA's policy that "federal 
courts stay completely out of the field of anticipatory 
adjudication of tax cases • • • • " Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 
8 2, 127 ( 19 71) (opinion of JUSTICE BRENNAN) (emphasis added) . 
See Rosewell, 101 S .Ct. at 1233-34, 1235 (1981); Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co., 319 u.s. 293, 301 (1943). S1nce 
satisfactory state relief is available, the TIA bars the DC 
action here. 
8 0 
it appears (although the papers before the Court do not include 
copies of their complaints) that the churches sought separate 
declaratory relief as to the validity of this federal 
provision. Neither does the federal equivalent, 26 u.s.c. 
§724l(a), of the TIA obviously remove this action from the DC's 
jurisdiction. The DC analyzed this quest ion, see S. G. Jur. 
Stmt. at 78a-86a, in a manner sufficiently sound as to render 
summary reversal definitely inappropriate. 
This suggests the Court may have a clear shot at the 
First Amendment merits of §3309(b) (1) in No. 228. Because the 
vPotential jurisdictional shoals now are not adequately briefed 
~----------------
by any of the parties, however, I recommend the Court's action 
be limited to postponing a note. I further recommend the Court 
take this action in all three appeals, to ensure all parties 
understand they are to brief all of their arguments. 
Unnecessary appeals can be dealt with in the full opinion. 
RECOMMENDATION: I recommend postpones in all three 
appeals. The Court should also call for the record so the 
pleadings can be examined. 
There is a response. 
10/10/81 Wiley Opinions in Jur Stmt 
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE POWELL 
Nos. 81-31, 81-228, & 81-455: 
California v. Grace Brethern Church 
March 30, 1982 
Questions Presented 
1. Does the Court have 28 u.s.c. §1252 jurisdiction to 
hear this direct appeal? 
2. Did the DC incorrectly interpret the Tax Injunction 






3. If so, can this Court nevertheless reach the merits 
of the first amendment issue? 
4. If so, does the Federal Unemployment Tax Act uncon-
stitutionally establish or impair the free exercise of religion? 
Discussion 
As I mentioned to you earlier, this memo concerns only 
the jurisdictional issues in this case and omits discussion of 
the first amendment merits. I organize the jurisdictional dis-
cussion around three separate questions. 
1. 
The District 
Section 1252 Jurisdiction 
tt-v 
court 1 s order by terms 
A 
only the state, and not the federal,.., statute. 
f 
declared invalid 
See JS 89a ,[4. 
Therefore there is a question whether the Court properly has ju-
risdiction over this appeal, since §1252 permits direct appeals 
only when "an Act of Congress" has been declared unconstitution-
al. In my view, however, the SG is correct in arguing that the 
DC 1 s judgment properly is interpreted as invalidating §3309 of 
the federal FUTA, based on the language in the DC 1 s memos. See 
JS 2la, 86a & n.39. Consequently I believe the Court does have 
jurisdiction to hear this direct appeal. 
2. Tax Injunction Act 
The TIA prohibits the federal injunction of state taxes 
if "plain, speedy, and efficient remedies" are available in state 
court. The DC here held that the TIA was not a bar because no 
such state remedy was available -- for two reasons. First, ac-
·' 
3. 
cording to the DC, the California Constitution and California 
statutes bar state tax injunctions. Second, the legal remedies 
in state court were inadequate because the very process of paying 
the FUTA tax infringed the church schools' religious freedom. 
On the first reason, the DC did observe that older Cali-
fornia cases make exceptions to California's constitutional and 
statutory bar in cases of constitutional challenges. These cases 
make it appear that state injunctive relief is available. Howev-
er, the DC rejected the authority of these state cases because 
they were "neither compelling nor recent." SG J.S. at 18a n.12. 
This reason alone is inadequate, it seems to me. The TIA is in-
tended "to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction 
to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection 
of taxes." Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 u.s. 503, 522 
(1981) . I think the TIA demands more deference to state cases 
-------------~------------------------suggesting that state remedies are adequate. But I am willing to 
concede that the availability of state equitable relief is doubt-
ful as a matter of state law, because I think the TIA remains a 
Assuming that state injunctive relief is not available, 
I think California does offer adequate legal relief against un-
constitutional state taxes. The SG describes the California pro-
cedure in footnote 10 of his brief. The California process re-
quires the taxpayer to pay the tax and then sue for a refund. 
The SG adds the good point that the California process is essen-
tially similar to the South Dakota procedure that brought St . 
. ' 




Martins Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota to the Court 
last Term. {The pay-and-sue-for-refund technique also was used 
in federal court in United States v. Lee {free exercise of Amish 
religion not imparied by FUTA and FICA) {decided 2/23/82)). Ac-
cording to the TIA's legislative history {the very brief Senate 
report is appended to this memo), it appears that such procedures ---are precisely the type of adequate state remedies envisioned by 
the TIA. The presence of such an adequate state legal remedy ---means the TIA blocks the DC use of injuctive relief against Cali-
fornia. 
The religious schools claim that legal relief is inade-
quate. They demand an injunction. Their story is that the very 
payment of the tax offends their first amendment religious free-
dom. 
I do not think the schools have made their case on this 
point. Their entanglement claims {on the merits of the first 
amendment point) focus on the state/church interaction occuring 
when a church school fires an employee. T~ distinct ~ 
from the schools' initial of the FUTA tax. I do not see 
how this initial payment creates an irreparable first amendment 
injury. This is especially true in light of the heightened fed-
er al deference owed to the state taxation mechanism after the 
Court's opinion in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary 
{decided 12/1/81) • 
I therefore conclude that the TIA indeed should have 





taxing authorties. This raises the issue of whether the TIA also 
bars the DC's award of declaratory relief. The Court has never 
squarely held that the TIA encompasses declaratory relief. But 
its decisions most recently in Fair Assessment -- certainly 
have suggested as much. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n 
~
v. McNary, No. 80-427, slip op. at 10-11. These suggestions can 
be criticized because declaratory relief does not cause one evil 
that the TIA aimed to eliminate: physicial interference with 
vital state revenue requirements. But Fair Assessment suggests 
that this objection conceives the purpose of the TIA too narrow-
ly. Indeed, Fair Assessment avoided a holding on the basis of 
the TIA by relying on parallel concerns of comity, which sufficed 
to keep the federal courts out of interfering with state tax mat-
ters entirely apart from the TIA statutory question. Under this 
logic, I think there is ample reason to believe that the DC in 
this case also lacked authority to subject California's tax mech-
anism to declaratory attack. 
In sum, the TIA barred the DC's award of both injunctive ) 
and declaratory relief against the state of California. \ 
3. Can the Court reach the merits in spite of the TIA? 
I don't think so. But my reasoning is complicated due 
to the intricate nature of the FUTA. Let me begin with some 
background. 
The FUTA is a federal program that enlists the aid of 
the states. FUTA imposes a wage tax on all employers, subject to 
certain exceptions. One except ion is charitable org ani za t ions 
'.~ . . .... ,. 
6. 
qualifying for §50l(c) (3) treatment. See FUTA, 26 U.S.C. 
§3306 (c) (8). As a result of this exception, none of the church 
schools in this suit pay or are threatened with any federal FUTA 
tax. 
The FUTA enlists the aid of the states by making it at-
tractive for them to set up parallel state unemployment insurance 
programs. Employers are permitted to deduct from their federal 
FUTA 90% of sums paid to qualifying state programs. Moreover, 
' the federal government offers grants to states to pay for their 
state FUTA administration costs. These incentives are suffi-
ciently attractive to have induced all the states to establish 
state-level unemployment insurance programs designed to meet fed-
eral standards. See 26 u.s.c. §§3304(a) (6) & 3309(b). 
Oddly, one federal requirement for the states' programs 
is that the states' programs must cover employers who escape the 
direct coverage of the federal FUTA tax. For instance, the 
church schools in this suit are not subject to the federal FUTA 
tax, as noted earlier on this page. But they are subject to the 
state programs, if the state programs are adapted (as all in fact 
are) to meet the minimum federal requirements. 
This situation initially led to a standing question in 
the DC. The government charged that the church schools had no 
standing to attack the federal program because the schools paid 
only state FUTA taxes. The DC rejected this argument, properly I 
think, on the basis that the federal government was causing Cali-
fornia to levy its state tax as it does. See JS 5a-7a: 77a-78a. 
\' ··\ ,, ' 
7. 
For standing purposes, then, the DC lumped together the state and 
federal FUTA programs as part of one causal chain. 
On page 2 of this memo, I have concluded that the DC's 
judgment should be read to invalidate portions of the federal 
FUTA statute. On pages 2-5 of this memo, I have concluded that 
the TIA should have barred the DC's relief against the California 
FUTA tax program. The question now is whether the DC relief 
against the federal government provides a sufficiently indepen-
dent basis for this Court to rule on the merits of the first 
amendment FUTA challenge. Put otherwise, should the federal 
courts treat the federal and state tax programs as a single unit 
for purposes of standing analysis, but as two distinct bundles of 
statutes for purposes of a remedy analysis? 
My reaction is that the characterization of the statutes 
for remedy purposes should parallel the characterization for 
standing purposes. That is, if the church schools are to gain 
standing by virtue of the fact that the federal and state pro-
grams are casually 1 inked, then I think that the two programs 
must be viewed as similarly linked for purposes of judging wheth-
er the relief against the federal government is distinct from the 
relief against the state government. In my view, the DC's decla-
ration that the federal program is unconstitutional cannot -- as 
a matter of causality -- be separated from the DC's attack on the 
state tax program. I consequently believe that the fiA bars the 
<..... 
~





* * * * 
The SG offers an entirely different justification for 
reaching the first amendment merits. He does not attempt to ar-
gue that any portion of the DC's remedy survived the TIA. Rath-
er, his view is that the Court should reach the constitutional 
merits notwithstanding the lack of DC jurisdiction "[i]n light of 
the public interest in, and the Secretary's need for, a definitve 
interpretation of 26 u.s.c. §3309(b) ." SG brief at 21. 
This position strikes me as remarkable. It is hard for 
me to believe that the SG believes the Court is entirely free to 
decide constitutional matters upon which a DC has ventured an 
opinion if this Court first determines that the DC lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction. For instance, suppose a DC found standing 
where no standing properly existed. Suppose further it then de-
clared a statute unconstitutional on controversial grounds. Sup-
pose finally that this Court confronts the standing issue and 
decides that the DC erred. Is the Court really entirely free to 
go on to agree the statute is invalid, even though no party to 
the litigation in fact had standing to bring the challenge in the 
first place? 
I have considerable doubt as to the Court 1 s power to 
deliever such a constitutional judgment. The cases on which the 
SG relies are i;>lainly distinguishable in this-----r-egard. In your 
opinion in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 u.s. 21, 31-32 (1975), the 
jurisdictional issue was whether a federal DC or a federal three-
judge court should have entertained the issue in the first in-
··. 
9. 
stance. A similar dispute about the propriety of a three-judge 
court was at issue in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 u.s. 749, 763 n.8 
(1975). In neither case was there a question (as there is in 
this case) whether the suit should have been in federal court at 
all. Despite the expansive language in McLucas stating "that 
this Court's jurisdiction under §1252 in no way depends on wheth-
er the district court had jurisdiction," 421 u.s. at 31, I would 
not expand the holdings in these cases to an instance in which 
there is no basis for any federal jurisdiction. 
I may be wrong about this Court's power to render con-
stitutional pronouncements on matters that originally could not 
have been within the domain of the federal courts. If so, I 
nonetheless believe that the Court still must possess some dis-
cretionary prudential power to decide when it is appropriate to 
reach such issues. Although I am sure that the SG indeed would 
find it more convenient to have an immediate ruling on the con-
stitutionality of FUTA's §3309, the need does not seem so compel-
ling as to overcome the very sizable TIA jurisdictional defect in 
the case. As the St. Martin decision from last term illustrates, 
the FUTA issue is a much-litigated one. I doubt the SG will have 
long to wait for a definitve ruling. Therefore, at least as a 
matter of discretion, I urge you to decline the SG's invitation 
to review a constitutional holding that the federal courts of 




The Court has §1252 jurisdiction to hear this direct 
appeal. But the DC lacked jurisdiction under the TIA to award 
the relief that it did. Consequently the Court should reverse on 
this basis. The Court should not engage in further constitution-
al discussion because it is unnecessary to the resolution of this 
case. 
r • •· 
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~ JUSTICE O'CONNOR de:ivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
The principal question presented by the parties to this 
appeal is whether certain state and federal statutes vio-
late the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the 
First Amendment1 by requiring religious schools unaffili-
.....c:·- ·-- - ~-
ated with any church to pay unemployment insurance taxes. -- ·-- -- - ----. 
We do not reach this substantive question, however, hold-
ing instead that the Tax Injunction Act, 28 u.s.c. §1341, 
dep:ive~ ~~ of ·u ·~ction to hear these 
I 
challenges. Accordingly, we vacate the ju4gment below and 
dismiss the appeal. 
I 
Last Term, in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
South Dakota, 451 u.s. 772 (1981), this Court considered 
statutory and constitutional challenges to provisions of 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 u.s.c. §§3301-
1The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses apply to the 
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 u.s. 296, 303 
(1940) ; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 u.S. 1, 15 
(1947). 
2. 
3311 (1976 ed. & Supp. IV). Because the present claims 
involve the same provisions that we interpreted in St. 
Martin, we recount only briefly the substance and legisla-
tive history of the relevant statutes before turning to 
the facts in the present case. 
A 
In FUTA, 2 Congress has authorized a cooperative federal-
state scheme to provide benefits to unemployed workers. 
The Act requires employers to pay an excise tax on wages 
paid to employees in "covered" employment, 3 but entitles 
them to a credit of up to 90% of the federal tax for con-
tributions they have paid into federally approved state 
unemployment compensation programs. 4 One of the require-
ments for federal approval is that state programs "cove~" 
2FUTA was enacted originally as Title IX of the Social 
Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 639 (1935). 
3see 26 u.s.c. §3301. 
4see 26 u.s.c. §3302. Each state program receives 
annual approval after the Secretary of Labor finds that it 
complies with federal statutory standards. See 26 u.s.c. 
§§3304 (a), (c). The federal standards for the state pro-
grams are contained in §§3304 and 3309. If a state plan 
complies with federal standards, the State is authorized 
to receive a federal grant to administer the state plan. 
See 29 u.s.c. §49d(b); 42 u.s.c. §501. 
· . ., . 
3. 
certain broad categories of employment. 
Until 1970, §3306 {c) {8) of FUTA excluded from the defi-
nition of covered employment "service performed in the 
employ of a religious, charitable, educational, or other 
[tax exempt] organization." Pub. L. No. 86-778, §533, 74 
Stat. 984. As a consequence, such organizations were not 
required to pay either federal excise taxes or state unem-
ployment compensation taxes. In 1970, Congress amended 
FUTA to require state plans to cover employees of nonprof-
it organizations, state hospitals, and state institutions 
of higher education, thus eliminating the broad exemption 
available to nonprofit organizations. 5 See §3309 {a) {1) • 
At the same time, Congress enacted §3309{b) to exempt from 
5see Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-373, §104 {b) {1), 84 Stat. 697. Under §§3309 {a) {2) 
and 3304{a) {6) {B), such nonprofit organizations were given 
the option of either making the same contribution to the 
state unemployment compensation fund required of other 
employers, or reimbursing the fund for unemployment com-
pensation payments actually made to the nonprofit organi-
zations' former employees. 
Although nonprofit organizations were covered by feder-
ally approved state unemployment compensation laws, they 
continued to be exempt from the federal excise tax on 
wages because the definition of "employment" in 
§3306{c) {8), excluding services performed for such organi-
zations, remained unchanged. 
4. 
mandatory state coverage a narrow class of religious and 
educational employees, i.e., those serving 
"(1) in the employ of (A) a church or conven-
tion or association of churches, or (B) an orga-
nization which is operated primarily for reli-
gious purposes and which is operated, super-
vised, controlled, or principally supported by a 
church or convention or association of churches; 
"(2) by a duly ordained, commissioned, or li-
censed minister of a church in the exercise of 
his ministry or by a member of a religious order 
in the exercise of duties required by such or-
der; 
"(3) in the employ of a school which is not an 
institution of higher education... • " 84 Stat. 
698. 
In 1976, Congress again amended FUTA, this time elimi-
nating the substance of §3309(b) (3), thereby removing the 
blanket exemption for school employees. See Unemployment 
Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 
§llS(b) (1), 90 Stat. 2670. 6 In order to maintain compli-
ance with FUTA, the States promptly amended their corre-
sponding state programs. See, ~, Cal. Un. Ins. Code 
§634.5(a), (b) (West Supp. 1981). 
B 
6In its place, Congress substituted an unrelated pro-
vision. 
- --- ..- ·- -------·-~----~---------__.. • .._ .. _ -...... .....~ ......... -·"""'"" ...... .... ¥ ..... 
5. 
The plaintiffs in this case, a number of California 
churches and religious schools, sought to enjoin the Sec-
retary of Labor from conditioning his approval of the Cal-
ifornia unemployment insurance program on its coverage of 
the plaintiffs' employees, and to enjoin the State from 
collecting both tax information and the state tax. 7 For 
the purposes of evaluating their statutory and consti tu-
tional claims, the District Court divided the plaintiffs 
into three classes of employers: Category I represents 
those schools that are part of the corporate structure of 
a church or association of churches; Category II includes 
schools that are separate corporations formed by a church 
or association of churches; and Category III includes 
schools that are "operated primarily for religious pur-
poses, but which [are] not operated, supervised, con-
trolled or principally supported by a church or convention 
or association of churches, i.e., an independent, non-
7This litigation grew out of two suits, one filed in 
the District Court by Grace Brethren Church, et al. (Case 
No. CV 79-93 MRP), and the other filed in state court by 
the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod. The Secretary of La-
bor successfully removed the Lutheran Church case (Case 
No. CV 79-162 MRP) to the District Court, which consoli-
dated the cases for trial. 
6 0 
church affiliated religious school." Supplemental Opin-
ion, reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement of the State of 
California, et al., Appendix {J.S. App.) at 71. 8 
On September 21, 1979, the District Court granted a pre-
liminary injunction against the State restraining it from 
collecting the state unemployment tax from the Category I 
plaintiffs. See J.S. App. 51. The basis for the court's 
order was its conclusion that the plaintiffs were exempt 
from mandatory state coverage under §3309 {b) {1) , and al-
ternatively, . that if they were not exempt under the terms 
of FUTA, collection of the tax from the plaintiffs would 
involve excessive governmental entanglement with religion, 
in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. See J.S. App. 58-65. 
In the same opinion, the District Court rejected the 
Federal Government's argument that, because the state rem-
edy was "plain, speedy and efficient," the Tax Injunction 
8category I and II schools comprise schools from the 
Lutheran Church case, see Order {filed April 3, 1981) , 
reprinted in J.S. App. 49, as well as some of the schools 
from the Grace Brethren case. See Order {filed April 3, 
1981), reprinted in J .s. App. 46. Category III schools 
include only schools from the Grace Brethren case. See 
ibid. 
7. 
9 Act, 28 u.s.c. §1341, barred the court from granting in-
junctive relief. Considering first the availability of 
injunctive relief from the state courts, the court con-
eluded that state statutory and constitutional 
provisions10 made such relief "at best, uncertain." J.S. 
9The Act provides: 
10 
"The district courts shall not enJOln, suspend 
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection 
of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy 
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of 
such State." 
Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1851 (West 1972) provides: 
"No injunction or writ of mandate or other legal 
or equitable process shall issue in any suit, 
action or proceeding, in any court against this 
State or against any officer thereof to prevent 
or enjoin the collection of any contribution 
sought to be collected under this division." 
Cal. Const., Art. XIII, §32 (West Supp. 1981) provides: 
"No legal or equitable process shall issue in 
any proceeding in any court against this State 
or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the 
collection of any tax. After payment of a tax 
claimed to be illegal, an action may be main-
tained to recover the tax paid, with interest, 
in such manner as may be provided by the Legis-
lature." 
Despite the apparently unambiguous language of these 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
App. 66. The court then concluded that a state suit for a 
prov1s1ons, the District Court considered the availability 
of injunctive relief only 11 uncertain 11 because of state 
decisions indicating that injunctive relief may be avail-
able when the plaintiff challenges the state tax law as 
being unconstitutional. See Las Animas & San Joaquin Land 
Co. v. Preciado, 167 Cal. 580, 587 (1914) (injunction 
available to restrain a school district from assessing 
property taxes on land over which it has no authority): 
Bueneman v. City of Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. 2d 405, 407 
(1937) (statutory provision precluding courts from enjoin-
ing execution of public laws for public benefit does not 
apply to claims that a taxing statute is 
unconstitutional). 
More recent decisions, however, have held injunctive 
relief to be precluded. See Modern Barber Colleges, Inc. 
v. California Em lo ent Stabilization Commission, 31 Cal. 
2d , (1 ( ol 1ng t at a prov1s1on in the Unem-
ployment Insurance Act, similar to §1851, prohibited in-
junctive relief, leaving the taxpayer only with the option 
to pay the tax and seek a refund): Aronoff v. Franchise 
Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 177, 180 (1963) (holding Cal. Const. 
Art. XIII, §15 and Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §19081 preclude 
issuance of an injunction to prevent collection of addi-
tional income taxes). Relying on Aronoff, a district 
court of appeal held that Cal. Const. Art. XIII, §32 
(which, in 1974, became the successor to §15) and the cor-
responding statutory provision, Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1851, 
prohibit the courts from enjoining the collection of un-
employment insurance taxes. Lorco Properties, Inc. v. 
Department of Benefit Payments, 57 Cal. App. 3d 809, 815 
(1976). Recently, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 27 Cal. 3d 277, 279 (1980) , the 
California Supreme Court held that under Cal. Const. Art. 
XIII, §32 a taxpayer was barred from seeking relief com-
pelling the state tax board to adjust the taxpayer's real 
property assessments. The court expressly held that there 
were no equitable exceptions to this rule, id., at 282, 
and reaffirmed the importance of the state policy to per-
mit the uninterrupted collection of taxes. Cf. Pacific 
Footnote continued on next page. 
> • 
9. 
refund was an inadequate remedy because the plaintiffs 
claimed not only that their property had been taken unlaw-
fully, but that the "very process of determining whether 
any tax is due at all results in a violation of their 
First Amendment rights." J • S • App. 6 7 • Because this 
First Amendment injury was "irreparable" once the taxes 
had been collected, only an injunction against collection 
of the tax could remedy the plaintiffs' claims. Accord-
ingly, because there existed no "plain, speedy and eff i-
cient" remedy in the state courts, the District Court con-
eluded that it had jurisdiction to grant injunctive re-
lief. 
In a Supplemental Opinion filed June 2, 1980, the court 
clarified its earlier opinion, stating expressly that the 
preliminary injunction covered only Category I plaintiffs. 
See J.S. App. 71. For the same reasons that it had grant-
Motor Transport Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 28 
Cal. App. 3d 230, 236 (1972) (noted without approval in 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 
supra, and holding that a taxpayer could seek declaratory 
relief to challenge the validity of a tax regulation, but 
that such relief could not "'prevent or enjoin' or other-
wise hamper present or future tax assessment or collection 
effort"). 
10. 
ed the initial preliminary injunction, however, the court 
extended the preliminary injunction to Category II plain-
tiffs. The court continued to deny relief to the Category 
III plaintiffs after concluding that they were not covered 
by the statutory exemptions in §3309(b) and that the risk 
of excessive governmental entanglement with religion was 
too small to violate the Establishment Clause. J.S. App. 
77-79. 11 
Finally, on April 3, 1981, the court filed a Second Sup-
plemental Opinion ruling on all of the plaintiffs' motions 
for permanent injunctions enjoining the State from col-
lecting unemployment compensation taxes and the Federal 
Government from conditioning approval of the state unem-
ployment compensation programs on their inclusion of the 
plaintiffs' employees. See J.S. App. 1. Considering 
first the statutory claims, the court concluded that Cate-
gory I and Category II schools, but not Category III 
schools, are exempt from coverage under §3309(b) of FUTA 
11The court also rejected the arguments offered by the 
Category III plaintiffs that imposition of the tax vio-
lates the Free Exercise Clause, and that the unique statu-
tory treatment of Category III plaintiffs violates equal 
protection. J.S. 78. 
11. 
and the corresponding state provision, Cal. Un. Ins. Code 
§634.5(a). J S A P 3-15.12 • • p • The court also found that 
the benefit entitlement decisions for employees of Catego-
ry III schools risk excessive governmenta~ entanglement 
with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment. J S A 25-33.13 • • pp. Consequently, 
the court held that "constitutional considerations bar 
application of the scheme" to the Category III plaintiffs. 
Id., at 33. 
Based on these findings, the court issued orders perma-
1 2The court held alternatively that if the Secretary of 
Labor's interpretation of §3309(b) were correct (i.e., 
Category I and II schools were not exempt from coverage) , 
then that provision violated the First Amendment because 
it caused excessive governmental entanglement with reli-
gion by requiring "[i]ntrusive monitoring of the activi-
ties of employees of religious schools in order to deter-
mine whether or not those employees are exempt from unem-
ployment insurance taxes" and by requiring 
" [ i] nvolvement of state officials in the resolution of 
questions of religious doctrine in the course of determin-
ing the benefit eligibility of discharged employees of 
religious schools." Order (filed April 3, 1982), reprint-
ed in J.S. App. 45, 46; Order (filed April 3, 1982), ~ 
pr1nted in J.S. App. 49, 50. 
13The court again rejected the plaintiffs' argument 
that statutory coverage of Category III schools violates 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, J.S. App. 
16-25, and found it unnecessary to reach the Category III 
plaintiffs' equal protection claim. J.S. App. 35. 
'' 
12. 
nently enjoining the federal defendants from requiring 
state unemployment insurance programs to cover Category I 
and Category II schools as a precondition for federal ap-
proval of the state programs, J.S. App. 47, 51, and perma-
nently enjoining the state defendants from "collecting, or 
attempting to collect, unemployment compensation ••• tax-
es" from the Category I, II, or III schools. J.S. App. 
47, 50. The court did not issue an injunction against the 
federal defendants as to Category III schools because it 
"has no information indicating what response, if 
any, the Secretary will make to the Court's con-
clusion that the state defendants may not con-
stitutionally impose the state unemployment com-
pensation tax scheme on the Category 3 employees 
of non-church affiliated schools. If the 
Secretary, in response to failure by the state 
defendants to collect unemployment compensation 
taxes on behalf of Category 3 employees, insti-
tutes decertification proceedings against the 
State of California, the parties may apply to 
this Court for further relief." Second Supple-
mental Opinion reprinted in J.S. App. 44 n. 39. 
Following issuance of the court's injunction, this Court 
decided St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South 
Dakota, supra, holding that §3309(b) (1) (A) exempts Catego-
ry I schools from mandatory coverage under the state unem-
ployment insurance programs. Although no Category II 
schools were before the Court in St. Martin, the Court 
• • . .
noted in~ote that 
"To est ish exemption from FUTA, a separately 
incorporated church school (or other organiza-
tion) must satisfy the requirements of 
3309 (b) (l!}(B) :- (1) that the organization 'is 
ope~ated primarily for religious purposes,' and 
(2) that it is 'operated, supervised, con-
trolled, or principally supported by a church or 
convention or association of churches.'" 451 
u.s., at 782 n.l2. 
13. 
As a result of this opinion, the Secretary of Labor re-
considered his position and decided that both Category I 
and Category II schools are statutorily exempt from manda-
..____ ----tory coverage under FUTA. Consequently ,~t:-;h-e-=fe-d ...... e_r....;;a:a.l de-
.___ ·----------,.... 
fendants, as well as the state defendants, have not ap-
· pealed the District Court's injunction involving Category 
I and Category II schools, but only that part of the Dis-
trict Court order involving the Category III schools.l4 
14see J .s. 11-12 (No. 81-31); Jurisdictional Statement 
for the United States, et al., at 4 n.2, 6 n.5 (No. 81-
228). The Category III schools are parties only in the 
Grace Brethren case, the suit originally filed in federal 
court. See n. 7 supra. 
The Grace Bretnren appellees filed a cross appeal (No. 
81-455) cla1m1ng that the District Court erred in holding 
that FUTA and the corresponding California statutory pro-
visions do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment. The cross appeal, however, is unneces-
sary to preserve this argument since under this Court's 
Rule 10.5 "an appellee, without filing a cross-appeal, 
Footnote continued on next page • 
14. 
II 
An initial matter requiring our attention is whether 
this Court has jurisdiction to hear these a peals. 15 Con-, ___ _ _ 
gress has provided that 
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from 
an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or 
oydero-~t of the United States ••• 
iA'folding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in 
any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which 
the United States or any of its agencies, or any 
officer or employee thereof, as such officer or 
employee, is a party." 28 u.s.c. §1252. 
The only possible doubt regarding our appellate jurisdic-
tion under this provision is the requirement that the Dis-
trict Court hold "an Act of Congress unconstitutional." 
In McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 u.s. 21 (1975), we stated 
that §1252 was an unambiguous exception to the policy of 
[may] defend a judgment on any ground that the law and 
record permit and that would not expand the relief he has 
been granted." 
The plaintiffs in the Lutheran Church case have filed an 
brief in support of the JUdgment below. Because, however, 
neither the State nor the Federal Government appealed from 
that part of the judgment involving the Lutheran Church 
plaintiffs, we do not address their claims. 
15In our order setting these cases for oral argument, 
we postponed the question of jurisdiction until consider-
ation of the merits. See 454 u.s. (1981). 
15. 
minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court. Indeed, 
the "language of the statute sufficiently demonstrates its 
purpose: to afford immediate review in this Court in civil 
actions to which the United States or its officers are 
parties and thus will be bound by a holding of unconstitu-
tionality." Id., at 31. Moreover, this Court has appel-
late jurisdiction under §1252 "when the ruling of uncon-
stitutionality is made in the application of the statute 
to a particular circumstance, rather than upon the 
challenged statute as a whole." Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 
u.s. 100, 102-103 (1947) (discussing the predecessor to 
§1252, Act of Aug. 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 751). See United 
States v. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 404 
u.s. 561, 563 (1972) (per curiam)~ United States v. 
Darusmont, 449 u.s. 292, 293 (1981). Finally, §1252 pro-
vides jurisdiction even though the lower court did not 
expressly declare a federal statute unconstitutional, so 
long as a determination that a statutory provision was 
unconstitutional "was a necessary predicate to the relief" 
that the lower court granted. United States v. Clark, 445 
u.s. 23, 26 n. 2 (1980) .16 
Footnote(s) 16 will appear on following pages. 
16. 
In the present case, the District Court did not express-
"""":""--.... ............... __ 
ly hold §3309 (b) of FUTA unconstitutional as applied to 
the Category III appellees,l7 but the effect of its sever--~ 
al opinions and orders was to make "the United States or 
its officers ••• bound by a holding of unconstitutionali-
ty." McLucas v. DeChamplain, supra, at 31. For example, 
while discussing the Establishment Clause claim of the 
Category III schools, the District Court held: 
"Since such entanglement [involving the resolu-
tion of questions of faith and doctrine by secu-
lar tribunals] is inevitable during the benefit 
eligibility determination process if religious 
schools are brought within the scope of the un-
employment compensation tax scheme, constitu-
tional considerations bar the application of the 
scheme to them." Second Supplemental Opinion, 
reprinted in J.S. App. 33 (emphasis added). 
Examination of other portions of the court's opinion makes 
clear that the court's use of the word "scheme" refers to 
16In Clark, the Court of Claims simply ordered relief 
based on 1 ts earlier decision in another case. In that 
earlier decision, the court had declared the challenged 
statutory provision unconstitutional. See Gentry v. Unit-
ed states, 212 Ct. Cl. 1, 546 F. 2d 343 (1976) , rehear1ng 
denied, 212 Ct. Cl. 27, 551 F.2d 852 (1977). 
17see Order (filed April 3, 1981), reprinted in J.S. 
App. 45, 46 (holding Cal. Un. Ins. Code §634.5(a) uncon-
stitutional, but making no direct reference to §3309(b)). 
-·- _ .. ------.,.-----·----------- ·---·---·- -· ... .......... ....... - _,.._ -,.. ·----~ ... 
t I ~ : fl' 
17. 
the combined federal and state provisions. See e.g., J.S. 
App. 26 (expressly referring to both federal and state 
statutorx provisions in discussing the "unemployment com-
pensation scheme"}; J.S. App. 25 (referring to the intent 
of Congress and the California legislature in discussing 
the "unemployment tax scheme"} • Moreover, the District 
Court's analysis leading to its order holding the Califor-
nia provision unconstitutional is based solely on its un-
derstanding of the operation and effect of FUTA, which of 
course prompted the passage of the corresponding state 
statute in the first place. 18 Cf. St. Martin Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, supra, at 780 n. 9 (hold-
ing that the Court could review the South Dakota Supreme 
18The court's analysis of Category I and II schools 
also demonstrates that it believed FUTA, as applied to 
Category III schools, to be unconstitutional. In its dis-
cussion of Category I and II schools, the court held that 
if it were to follow the Secretary's interpretation of 
§3309, i.e., if no exemption existed, then FUTA would be 
unconstitutional as applied to those schools in part be-
cause of the excessive governmental entanglement in the 
benefit eligibility hearing. See n. 12 supra. Since the 
court also found an entanglement problem with respect to 
benefit eligibility hearings for Category III schools, and 
since there is no statutory exemption for those schools, 
it follows that the District Court must have believed that 
FUTA was unconstitutional as applied to the Category III 
plaintiffs. 
18. 
Court's . interpretation of its unemployment compensation 
tax statute because its "analysis depended entirely on its 
understanding of the meaning of FUTA and the First Amend-
ment"). Finally, in its Second Supplemental Opinion, the 
court made clear that if the Secretary "institutes decer-
tification proceedings against the State of California" 
for failing to collect unemployment compensation taxes on 
behalf of Category III employees, "the parties may apply 
to this Court for further relief," which can only mean 
injunctive relief against the Secretary. J.S. App. 44 n. 
39. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Sec-
retary is .....____ 
that this 
appeal. 
"bound by a holdin of unconstitutionality," and 
'---
C~has jurisdiction under §1252 to hear this 
--- .... - ----..... 
III 
As we noted above, the District Court enjoined the state 
defendants from collecting state unemployment compensation 
taxes from the Category III schools. 19 In the course of 
19No federal tax is involved in this case, for the ser-
vices performed for Category III schools are exempted by 
§3306 (c) (8) from the definition of employment for which 
the federal excise tax must be paid. 
,/ 
19. 
granting this injunctive relief, the court expressly re-
jected the Federal Government's argument that the Tax In-
----~---ju ction Act, 28 u.s.c. §1341, deprived the court of ju-
risdiction. See J.S. App. 65-69. Consequently, before 
reaching the merits of the appellees' claim, we must de-
cide whether the District Court correctly ruled that it 
had jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act. 
A 
The Tax Injunction Act states simply that the district ------courts "shall not enjoin ••• the ••• collection of any tax 
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy 
may be had in the courts of such State." Accordingly, the 
District Court was without jurisdiction to issue its in-
junction in this case unless the appellees had no "plain, 
speedy and efficient remedy" in the state courts. 
Last Term, in Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 
u.s. 503 {1981), this Court had occasion to consider the 
meaning of the "plain, speedy and efficient" exception in 
the Tax Injunction Act. After reviewing previous 
decisions 20 and the legislative history of the Act, 21 the 
20see Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 u.s. 68, 74 {1976); 
Footnote cont1nued on next page. 
Footnote{s) 21 will appear on following pages. 
20. 
court concluded that the "plain, speedy and efficient" 
exception requires the "state-court remedy [to meet) cer-
tain minimal procedural criteria." Id., at 512 (emphasis 
in original). In particular, a state court remedy is 
"plain, speedy and efficient" only if it "provides the 
taxpayer with a 'full hearing and judicial determination' 
at which she may raise any and all constitutional objec-
tions to the tax." Id., at 514 (quoting LaSalle National 
Bank v. County of Cook, 57 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 312 N.E. 2d 
252, 255-256 (1974)) • 22 Applying these considerations, 
the Rosewell Court held that an Illinois tax scheme, re-
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 u.s. 620, 625 (1946); Great 
Lakes Dreage & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 u.s. 293, 300-301 
(1943) • 
21see 81 Cong. Rec. 1416 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone); 
s. Rep. No. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 {1937). The 
Court also relied on the legislative history of the John-
son Act of 1934, 28 u.S .c. §1342 (prohibiting federal 
court interference with orders issued by state administra-
tive agencies to public utilities), on which the Tax In-
junction Act was modeled. 
22see also 450 u.S., at 515 & n. 19; 517 (making clear 
that some opportunity to raise constitutional objections 
is the most important consideration); S. Rep. No. 1035, 
75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 {1937) (under the Tax Injunction 
Act, a "full hearing and judicial determination of the 
controversy is assured. An appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the United States is available as in other cases"). 
- --- -·-·------... ~- .............. ---"--· ,...........--... -.,..,.,., ....... ~ ............... . 
'' 
21. 
quiring the taxpayer to pay an allegedly unconstitutional 
tax23 and seek a refund through state administrative and 
judicial procedures, was a "plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act. In 
reaching this holding, the Court specifically relied on 
legislative history demonstrating congressional awareness 
that refunds were the exclusive remedy in many state tax 
systems. 24 The Court believed that its holding would ad-
vance the principal purpose of the Act: "to limit drasti-
cally federal district court jurisdiction to interfere 
with so important a local concern as the collection of 
taxes." 450 u.s., at 522. 
The holding in Rosewell reflects not only Congress' ex-
press command in the Tax Injunction Act, but also the his-
torical reluctance of the federal courts to interfere with 
the operation of state tax systems. As this Court stated 
23The plaintiff in Rosewell had claimed that requiring 
payment of the county property tax violated her equal pro-
tection and due process rights. 
24see s. Rep. 1035, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937) 
(state "statutes generally provide that taxpayers may con-
test their taxes only in refund actions after payment un-




in Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 110 (1870), long 
before enactment of the Tax Injunction Act: 
"It is upon taxation that the several States 
chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on 
their respective governments, and it is of the 
utmost importance to all of them that the modes 
adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be 
interfered with as little as possible. Any de-
lay in the proceedings of the officers, upon 
whom the duty is devolved of collecting the tax-
es, may derange the operations of government, 
and thereby cause serious detriment to the pub-
lic. 
"No court of equity will, therefore, allow its 
injunction to issue to restrain their action, 
except where it may be necessary to protect the 
rights of the citizen whose property is taxed, 
and he has no adequate remedy by the ordinary 
processes of the law. It must appear that the 
enforcement of the tax would lead to a multi-
plicity of suits, or produce irreparable injury, 
• • • beforzs the aid of a court of equity can be 
invoked." 
25see also Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co. v. 
Boise City, 213 u.s. 276, 282 (1909) (holding that "the 
illegality or unconstitutionality of a state or municipal 
tax or imposition is not of itself a ground for equitable 
relief in the courts of the United States. In such a case 
the aggrieved party is left to his remedy at law, when 
that remedy is as complete, practicable and efficient as 
the remedy in equity"); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Bene-
dict, 229 u.S. 481, 488 (1913) (holding that federal 
courts will not enjoin the collection of unconstitutional 
state taxes where the taxpayer "ha[s] a plain, adequate 
and complete remedy" at law) ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock 
Co. v. Huffman, 319 u.s. 293, 299 (1943) (holding that the 
same "considerations which have led federal courts of eq-
uity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, 
save in exceptional cases, require a like restraint in the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
23. 
\ 
Similarly,( JUSTICE BRENNAN set forth the policies underly-
ing federql judicial~straint in his concurring and dis-
senting opirii-on i n/Perez v. Ledesma, 401 u.s. 82, 128 n. 
17 (1971), quoted by Court with approval earlier this 
Term: : 
"If federal declaratory relief were available to 
test state tax assessments, state tax adminis-
tration might be thrown into disarray, and . tax-
payers might escape the ordinary procedural re-
quirements imposed by state law. our ing the 
pendency of the federal suit the collection of 
revenue under the challenged law might be ob-
structed, with consequent damage to the State's 
budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the 
risk of taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal 
constitutional issues are likely to turn on 
questions of state tax law, which, like issues 
of state regulatory law, are more properly heard 
in the state courts." Fair Assessment in Real 
Estate Ass'n., Inc. v. McNary, 445 u.s. 100, 
n. 6 (1981). 
With these cases and principles in mind, we turn to the 
use of the declaratory judgment procedure"); Fair Assess-
ment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 u.s. 100, 
(1981) (holding that comity bars a taxpayer's damages 
action brought in federal court under 42 u.s.c. §1983 to 
redress allegedly unconstitutional tax assessments, in 
part because the federal suit "would be no less disruptive 
of [the State's] tax system than would the historic equi-
table efforts to enjoin the collection of taxes, efforts 




California provisions to determine whether there exists a 
"plain, speedy and efficient" state remedy for the appel-
lees' claim. 
B 
There is no dispute that appellees in the present case 
can seek a refund of the California unemployment tax 
through state administrative . and judicial procedures. 
Once a taxpayer has sought and been denied a refund from 
the appropriate state agency, ,see ·cal. un.· Ins. Code 
§§1176-1185 (West 1972 & Supp. 1981) , 26 he may file an 
action in Superior Court for a refund of the taxes paid, 
raising all arguments against the validity of the tax. 
Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1241 (West Supp. 1981). If the tax-
26Apparently, California taxpayers cannot raise their 
constitutional challenges in the administrative tax refund 
proceeding unless an appellate court already has sustained 
such a challenge. See Cal. Const. Art. III, §3.5 (West 
Supp. 1981), which provides in part that 
"An administrative agency .•• has no power: 
" (a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or 
refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it 
being unconstitutional unless an appellate court 
has made a determination that such statute is 
unconstitutional; 
"(b) To declare a statute unconstitutional." 
25. 
payer is unsuccessful at trial, he may appeal the decision 
to higher state courts and ultimately seek review in this 
Court. Nothing in this scheme prevents the taxpayer from 
"rais [ ing] any and all constitutional objections to the 
tax" in the state courts. Rosewell v. LaSalle National 
Bank, supra, at 514. 27 Moreover, assuming that the appel-
lees' constitutional claims are meritorious, an issue on 
which we express no view, there is every reason to believe 
that once a state appellate court has declared the tax 
-- ------- - ---- -
unconstitutional the appropriate state agencies will re-
--~ 
27significantly, the California administrative and ju-
dicial scheme for challenging a tax assessment is remark-
ably similar to the Illinois scheme that we upheld in 
Rosewell as "plain, speedy and efficient." See 450 u.s., 
at 508-509 & nn. 6-7. In fact, the California tax scheme 
is more favorable to the taxpayer than the Illinois scheme 
in that it requires the State to pay interest on improper-
ly collected taxes. See Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1242 (West 
Supp. 1981) 
This Court has not hesitated to declare a state refund 
provision inadequate to bar federal relief if the taxpay-
er's opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in the 
state proceedings is uncertain. In Hillsborough v. Crom-
well, 326 u.s. 620 (1946) , the taxpayer could not ra1se 
h1s constitutional challenge in the administrative pro-
ceedings, and appeal to the state courts was discretionary 
with those courts. Consequently, because "there [was] 
such uncertainty concerning the New Jersey remedy as to 
make it speculative," id., at 625, the Court held that the 
taxpayer could seek declaratory relief in federal court. 
26. 
spect that declaration. See Pacific Motor Transport Co. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 28 Cal. App. 3d 230, 236 
(1972) (noting that while the "relief afforded may not 
'prevent or enjoin' or otherwise hamper present or future 
tax assessment or collection effort ••• [i]t will be pre-
sumed that the governmental agency will respect a judicial 
declaration concerning a regulation's validity"). Accord-
ingly, it appears that Rosewell is directly applicable to 
the present case, and that the District Court had no ju-
risdiction to hear the appellees' claims. 
The appellees contend, however, that the California re-
fund procedures do not constitute a "plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy" because their claims can be remedied 
only by injunctive relief, and that such relief is un-
available in California courts to restrain the collection 
of state taxes. See n. 10 supra. Injunctive relief is 
necessary, the appellees claim, because prior to state 
judicial review, the employer must meet certain 
recordkeeping, registration, and reporting requirements, 
see Cal. Un. Ins. Code §§1085, 1086, 1088, 1092, and po-
tentially is subject to administrative benefit eligibility 
hearings 28 in violation of the appellees' First Amendment 
Footnote(s) 28 will appear on following pages. 
- 27. 
rights. The appellees thus fear that their constitutional 
rights will be violated before they have an opportunity to 
challenge the constitutionality of the unemployment tax 
scheme in state court. 
This argument is unpersuasive. First, nothing in the 
California scheme precludes the appellees from challenging 
the unemployment tax before a benefit eligibility hearing 
is held for one of their former employees. As soon as an 
employer makes its first payment to the state unemployment 
insurance fund, it may file for a refund and, after ex-
hausting state administrative remedies, seek a judicial 
determination of the constitutionality of the tax. 29 If 
28under Cal. Un. Ins. Code §1256, a former employee 
can collect unemployment benefits only if he has not been 
dismissed for "misconduct" or "left his most recent work 
voluntarily without good cause." 
29Part of the appellees' argument for the necessity of 
injunctive relief rests on the premise that payments to 
the state fund are made only after a benefit eligibility 
hearing has been held. Under 26 u.s.c. §§3309 {a) (2) and 
3304 (a) (6) (B), however, the States are required to give 
nonprofit organizations, including the appellees, the op-
tion either of making regular contributions to the state 
unemployment insurance fund or of reimbursing the fund for 
payments actually made to the employers' former employees. 
The nonprofit organizations are not required to choose the 
reimbursement method, however, and can make regular pay-
ments to the fund in advance of any employee being dis-
Footnote continued on next page. 
28. 
the employer ultimately prevails on his constitutional \ 
argument, the state taxing· authorities can be expected to 
respect that court's holding in future administrative pro-
ceedings. See Pacific Motor Transport Co. v. State Board 
of Equalization, supra, at 236. Thus, before any entan-
glement from the benefit eligibility hearings occurs, the 
appellees should be able to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the state unemployment insurance taxes. 
Second, while an employer may be subject to some 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements, or even a bene-
fit eligibility hearing, pending the resolution of its 
constitutional claims in state court, it will be subject 
to the same burdens even if it seeks relief from the fed-
eral courts. Thus, whatever harm the appellees may suffer 
pending resolution of their constitutional claims, that 
harm is not reduced by seeking relief in federal court. 
Stated differently, there are no apparent advantages to 
federal court relief that make state court remedies less 
than "plain, speedy and efficient."30 
charged. 
Footnote(s} 30 will appear on following pages. 
29. 
Finally, we must keep in mind that at the time that it 
passed the Tax Injunction Act, Congress was well aware 
that refund procedures were the sole remedy in many States 
for unlawfully collected taxes. See s. Rep. No. 1035, 
75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937): H.R. Rep. No. 1053, 75th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937). Carving out a special excep-
tion for taxpayers raising First Amendment claims would 
undermine significantly Congress' primary purpose "to lim-
it drastically federal district court jurisdiction to in-
terfere with so ~tant a local concern as the collec-
tion of taxes." Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, supra, 
at 522. 31 Because we do~believe that Congress intend-
-;;----~ ~ 
ed federal injunctions to disrupt state tax administration 
when state refund procedures are available, we d~ to 
-----------------------------
3°our conclusion that the state court remedy is plain, 
speedy and efficient is reenforced by our observation that 
it took the appellees in this case over two years to ob-
tain injunctive relief. 
31In addition, there seems to be no principled basis 
for limiting the appellees' argument to First Amendment 
claims. Any employer required to pay state taxes in a 
manner allegedly violating the Equal Protection Clause, 
for example, might argue that the absence of state injunc-
tive relief permitted the infliction of an irreparable 
injury that could be remedied only by a federal injunc-
tion. 
30. 
find an exception in the Tax Injunction Act for the appel-
lees' claims. 32 Accordingly, because the appellees could 
i 
seek a refund of their state unempioyment insurance taxes, 
and thereby obtain state judicial review of their consti-
tutional claims, hat their remedy under state law 
was "plain, speedy efficient" within the meaning of -the Tax Injunction Act, and consequently, that the Dis-
trict Court had no jurisdiction to issue injunctive or 
declaratory relief.~ 
32we also reject the appellees' argument to the extent 
that it assumes that the state courts will not protect 
their constitutional rights. As we stated in another con-
text, "we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a 
general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional 
rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several 
States. State courts, like federal courts, have a consti-
tutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to 
uphold federal law." Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 494 
n. 35 (1976). 
33The state defendants also argue that because the Fed-
eral Government is an indispensable party to this action, 
and could not be compelled to submit to state court juris-
diction, the state courts could not afford the appellees 
complete relief. Consequently, the state defendants rea-
son, the Tax Injunction Act does not deprive the District 
Court of jurisdiction. See Brief for State of California, 
at 35. The error in this argument is its premise: as St. 
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, sup~ 
demonstrates, the Federal Government need not be a party 




Despite the absence of jurisdiction in the District 
Court, the federal defendants urge us to consider the mer-
its of the appellees' First Amendment claims because of 
the "public interest in, and the Secretary's need for, a 
def ini ti ve interpretation of 26 U.S .c. §3309 (b) • " Brief 
for the United States, at 21. The Government bases this 
argument on our decision in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 
u.S. 21, 32 (197 5) , in which we held that "whether the 
District Court did or did not have jurisdiction to act, 
this case is properly here under §1252." See also Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 u.s. 749, 763 n. 8 (1975). 
The Government's argument is unavailing, however, for in 
McLucas and Salfi, some federal trial court had jurisdic-
tion,34 whereas in the present case, no federal district 
court had jurisdiction. If this Court were nonetheless to 
reach the First Amendment issues presented in this appeal, 
the litigants would have sidestepped neatly Congress' in-
34In both of those cases, the question was whether a 
single district judge or a three-judge district court had 
jurisdiction. In the present case, by contrast, the issue 
is whether the federal courts or the state courts have 
jurisdiction. 
32. 
tent and our longstanding policy "to limit drastically" 
federal interference in the administration of state taxes 
when a "plain, speedy and efficient" state remedy is 
available. 35 Accordingly, we do not reach the appellees' 
First Amendment claims. 
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the 
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
35similarly, the state defendants' reliance on Williams 
v. Zbaraz, 448 u.S. 358 (1980) , is misplaced. In that 
case, the District Court had held unconstitutional a fed-
eral statute that the parties had not challenged. We held 
that because there was no case or controversy on that is-
sue, the District Court had exceeded its jurisdiction for 
that issue. Id., at 367. Nevertheless, because of the 
holding of unconstitutionality we concluded that we had 
jurisdiction under §125 2 to "review the 'whole case.'" 
Id., at 368. That review, however, was restricted to 
those issues over which the District Court had had juris-
diction, and we vacated that portion of the judgment hold-
ing the federal statute unconstitutional. Ibid. 
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June 2, 1982 
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Grace Brethren Church 
Dear Sandra: 
As soon as I can get to it, I will be 
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~as-Jringion. ~. <!J. 20giJ!.~ 
CHAMBE RS OF" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, JR. June 2, 1982 
Nos. 81-31, 81-228, 81-455 California v. Grace Brethren 
Dear Sandra: 
I am generally in agreement with your circulation of 
June 1 in this case. However, as I noted at conference, 
this case clearly presented the question, long left unde-
cided in our cases, whether the Tax Injunction Act itself 
bars federal district court actions for declaratory re-
lief. As recently reaffirmed earlier this term in both 
the Court's opinion and the concurring opinion in FAIR 
Assessment, Great Lakes v. Huffman re s ted not on the view 
that declarqtory relief was barred by the Tax Injunction 
Act itself, but on the view that such relief was barred 
by those principles of comity which were encapsulated in 
the TIA. 
Here, declaratory relief was clearly sought in the 
district court~ indeed, it appears to have been granted 
below. And the issue whether the Tax Injunction Act it-
self bars declaratory relief, or whether the bar is sim-
ply one of comity, is necessarily reached on the facts of 
this case. The TIA is jurisdictional~ its bar cannot be 
waived. But if the bar to declaratory relief in federal 
court is purely one of comity, it of course can be waived 
by the State~ indeed, as I read the record it was con-
sciously waived here by the State which had very strong 
reasons for wishing to have the litigation proceed in 
federal court where the United States would be a party. 
Of course, as I said at conference, I have little 
difficult co u · hat the Tax In'unction Act, rea-
sonably construed, does 1n fact bar f s of an 'ci-
pat~lief--lnc u 1ng declaratory judgment 
suits. Do you think you might accomodate such a holding 
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.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
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~as'fringflln, ~· (!}. 21l.;tJ!.~ 
June 2, 1982 
Re: Nos. 81-31, 81-228, 81-455 California v. Grace Brethren 
Dear Bill, 
I agree with you that declaratory relief was sought in 
the district court and was granted below. I have no 
objection to addressing directly the issue of whether the 
Tax Injunction Act itself bars declaratory relief or whether 
the bar is one of comity, provided that there is no objection 
I by the majority who voted at Conference to vacate and remand. My notes do not reflect that others expressed a view on this point at Conference. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
Ay'\ Df-fr(Js.s kvtJ~ {A)CJ,_Jc{ lo-e be+kv: :c ~k 
s~u~ Wf[T-e fv SOL ~ffP5,C;t~ 10Uv t1:JYee~ 
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~asJrin.gton. ~- <!J. 20~)1.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 3, 1982 
Re: 81-31, 81-228 & 81-455 - California v. 
Grace Brethren Church 
Dear Sandra, 
Bill Brennan's point is well taken, I 




Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
( . 
June 3, 1982 
81-31, 81-228, 81-455 California v . Grace Brethren 
Dear Sandra: 
I agree with Bill Brennan that it would be 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 7, 1982 
(81-31 -·California, et al. v. Grace Brethren Church 
( 
Re: (81-288- U.S. v. Grace Brethren Church 
( 
(81-455 - Grace Brethren Church v. U.S. 
Dear Sandra: 
I join and I have no problems with Bill 
Brennan's suggestion. 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
;rune 8, 1982 
81-31 California v. Grace Brethren rhurch 
Dear Sandra: 
1 am still with you. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Si.ncer.eJv, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR. 
.iu;rrtutt <!Jo:urlo:f flrt 'Jilnitt~ .§taft.s 
:.ltil!p:n.gtllt4 ~. <q. 2!lbl~.;l 
June 9, 1982 
RE: No. 81-31 California v. Grace Brethren Church 
Dear Sandra: 
I agr~e with your recirculation of June 8. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.._, 
i'n:prtmt (!JD'ltrlltf tlft ~tb .Statts 
.. a.eJringhttt. ~. <!J. 21J~~~ 
J\.llle 9, 1982 
/ 
Re: Nos. 81-31, 81-228, 81-455 California v. 
Grace Bretheran Church 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, / t ~,...,/ .. 
A/ 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.:%utrttltU' Qfou.rt of tqt '~lnii:tb .:§tatu 
'lllasqingtcn, ~. Of. 2llpJ!.~ 
June 9, 1982 
J 
Re: Nos. 81-150 and 81-546-Northern Pipeline v. 
Marathon Pipe Line and U.S. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Dear Bill: 
Plea?e join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
t-
.;§u:prtmt <!Jourt of tqt 'Jltnittb .:%taus 
'lllasirtngtttn, p. <g. 2ll.?J!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 9, 1982 , · · ..., " : ··.~ 
Re: No. 81-31-California v. Grace Brethren Church 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 
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JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
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June 15, 1982 
Re: 81-31, 81-228 and 81-455 -
California v. Grace Brethren Church 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice O'Connor 
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JuLY 22 (calendar day, Aua. 2), 1937.-0rdered to be printed. 
Mr. CoNNALLY, from the Committee. on the Judiciary, submitted the 
following 
REPORT 
[To accompany S. 1551] 
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(S. 1551) to amend section 24 of the Judicial Code, after consideration 
thereof, report the bill favorably to the Senate with the recommenda-
tion that it do pass. 
S. 1551 amends section 24 of the Judicial Code, as amended, with 
respect to the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States 
over suits relating to the collection of State taxes. The bill reads as 
follows: , · 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That the first paragraph of section 24 of the 
Judicial Code, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, no district court 
l
ehaU have jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, 
evy, or collection of any tax imposed by or pursuant to the laws of any State 
• 'IVt here a. plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in 
he courts of such State." . . . 
. SEc. 2. The provisions of this Act shall not affect suits commenced in the 
~trict courts, either originally or by removal, prior to its pasasge; and all such 
~u1ts shall be continued, proceedings therein had, appeals therein taken, and 
ltUhdgments therein rendered, in the same manner and with the same effect as if 
is Act had not been passed. · · -
h 
This legislation does not introduce a n~w principle, since the Congress 
as passed statutes of similar import. 1lt is the common practice for 
statutes of the various States to forbid actions in State court~ to 
~njoin the collection of State and county taxes unless the tax law is 
tnvalid or the property is exempt from taxation, and these statutes 
generally provide th~yers may contesf thei:r;_ taxes -only in 
tef~nd actions after payment under protest. - This type of State 
legisl~siole for the States and their various agencies 
to survive while long-drawn-out tax litigation is in progress. If those I 
to wh()m the Federal courts are open may secure injunctive relief . 
• ,.. r"' . 
•· 
2 Al\U.:~DI~G THB JUDICIAL CODE 
g.ainst the collection of taxes, the highly unfair pi.cture is priented 
the citizen..oUhe-.State being reguireclto pay first _!1n_llhen litigate 
bile tliose privileged to sue in the Federal courts ne~d a.]~at 
hey_~o~se . and wi£l~ho1d the ·balance during t~e pe.tio . . ~itigation. 
Tlie ex1stmg practice of the F ederal courts m entertammg tax-in. 
junction suits against State officers makes it possible for foreign corp0• 
rations doing business in such States to withhold from them and their 
governmental subdivisions', taxes in such vast amounts and for such 
long periods of time as to seriously disrupt State O:nd county finances. 
The pressing needs of these Sta.tes for this tax money is so great that 
in many instances they have been compelled to compromise these 
suits, as a result of which substantial portions of the tax have been · 
lost to the States without a judicial examination into the real merits 
of the controversy. r . . . . 
! 
The attorney general of each of the 'following States has seen fit to 
urge passage of this bill: Alabama, California, Florida, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Okla-
homa, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia 
and Wyoming. . ' 
( 
It should be emphasized that the bill does not take away any equit-
able right of the taxpayer or deprive him of his d(ly in court. Specific 
provision is made that the suit will not be withdrawn from the juris-
diction of the Federal district court except where there is a plain 
speedy, and efficient remedy at law or in equity in the courts of th~ 
{ 
State . . A full hearing an. d judicial determination_pUJ.:!SLC4>11t.r.QY.grsy 
is assured. An appeal to t_E.~J)up!~~I_nELQQu_rt _.oUh.e Unitcd~s is 
av.ail able-as til' other cases. · · 
· The- propriety of this kind of legislation was fully discussed by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee when the so-called Johnson Act of May 
14, 1934, S. 752, Public, No. 222, was favorably reported and subse-
quently passed by the Congress. . · 
The report on the Johnsen bill pointed out that the continuance of 
the unjust discrimination between citizens of the State and foreign 
corporu.tions doing business in such State has been the cause of much 
controversy. The controversies arising out of the use of the in-
junctive process in State tax cases would be eliminated by the passage 
of this bill. · 
The question of the constitutionality of this type of legislation was 
I 
also discussed in the report on the Johnson bill, which pointed out 
decisions of the Supreme Court which removed any question of the 
right of Congress to limit jurisdiction of Federal district courts in 
matters of th.is kind. There being no question of the constitutional 
1 
right of the Congress to enact such legislation, the only remaining 
question is that of the :2ropriety and wisdom of such legislation. 
The district courts of the United States derive their jurisdiction wholly 
from the authority of Congress, as was clearly pointed out in Kline v. 
Burke Construction Company (260 U.S. 226 (1922)). In that case the 
Supreme Court held that Congress might give, withhold or restrict 
such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond 
the boundaries fixed by the Constitution. As far back as 1799 the 
case of Turner v. Bank of America, Mr. Justice Chase, SMaking for 
the Supreme Court, laid at rest any question of the right of CO'ngress to 
enact th.is sort of legislation. · 
Since th 
upheld in a 
which revi1 
in the case 






AMENDii.O THE JUDICIAL CODE . .... 3 
Since the Johnson Act was passed its constitutionality has been 
upheld in an opinion in the United States District Court of Mississippi, 
which reviewed at length the constitutional basis for such legislation 
in the case of Mississippi Power & Light Company v. City of Jackson 
(9 Fed. Supp. 564). 
A contemplation of the wisdom and desirability of this sort of \ 
legislation rising out of the compelling needs of many States for a 
more prompt disposition of tax controversies of the character referred 
to, impels us to recommend the prompt passage of S. 1551. 
0 
-
AMEND!~ THE JUDICIAL CODE .... 3 
Since the Johnson A.ct was passed its constitutionality has been 
upheld in an opinion in the United States District Court of Mississippi, 
which reviewed at length the constitutional basis for such legislation 
in the case of Mississippi Power & Light Company v. City of Jackson 
(9 Fed. Supp. 564). -
A. contemplation of the wisdom and desirability of this sort of 
legislation rising out of the compelling needs of many States for a 
more prompt disposition of tax controversies of the character referred 
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